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THE EFFECTS OF MARKET ECONOMY AND FOREIGN MNE SUBSIDIARIES ON THE 
CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE OF HRM  
 
ABSTRACT 
This study explores patterns of human resource management (HRM) practices across market economies, 
and between indigenous firms and foreign MNE subsidiary operations, offering a novel perspective on 
convergence and divergence. Applying institutional theorizing to improve our understanding of 
convergence/ divergence as a process and an outcome, data collected from nine countries at three points 
in time over a decade confirm that convergence and divergence occur to different extents in a non-linear 
fashion, and vary depending on the area of HRM practice observed. Patterns of adoption and 
convergence/ divergence are explained through the effect of institutional constraints, which vary between 
liberal and coordinated market economies, and between indigenous firms and foreign MNE subsidiaries. 
The study contributes a more graded conceptualization of convergence/ divergence, which reflects the 
complex dynamic reality of international business.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) are key contributors to the spread of business practices around the 
world (Edwards, Sánchez-Magnas, Jalette, Lavelle & Minbaeva, 2016). However, neo-institutional theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001) posits that context will be an important constraint on managerial 
autonomy over business practices. Human resource management (HRM) is a particular test case, having 
long been identified as the most ‘national’ of practices (Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994). Does the global 
drive for convergence on the basis of the most economically effective practices apply to HRM, or do 
economies with different institutional bases continue to constrain the possibility of convergence? And do 
local subsidiaries of MNEs act as norm entrepreneurs or are they similarly constrained by the institutional 
base? We use data from an extensive international survey, with a more comprehensive and diverse range 
of HRM practices than in previous studies, to examine these under-researched temporal developments, 
offering a novel, non-dichotomous, approach to convergence/ divergence that better reflects the dynamic 
reality of international business. Consequently, we uncover new categories of the convergence/ 
divergence process and demonstrate these through our findings. We make an additional contribution by 
examining simultaneously convergence over time from two under-researched sub-dimensions of 
geographic location, i.e. market economy and location of operation (indigenous vs. foreign), as well as the 
interactions among these dimensions. 
In the International HRM literature, there is a lively debate about the extent to which the actions 
of MNEs and a tendency towards global standardization are fueling convergence (Brewster, Mayrhofer, 
& Smale, 2016; Edwards et al., 2016). This literature focusses on mezzo-level processes playing out in 
MNEs (Kaufman, 2016) arguing that HRM practices, like other management practices, are being 
standardized to a universal paradigm (Lawler, Chen, Wu, Bae & Bai, 2011; Pudelko & Harzing, 2008). 
While it is acknowledged that some MNEs are polycentric (Perlmutter, 1969) and make no attempt to 
standardize any of their practices, preferring to exploit subsidiary specific advantages (Rugman & 
Verbecke, 2001), the predominant discourse suggests that many MNEs do attempt to standardize their 
operations globally. Other firms adopt the best practices of those that are more successful, believing that 
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this will improve their own performance (Björkman, Smale, Sumelius, Suutari & Lu, 2008). As practices 
are mimicked, with MNE subsidiaries providing examples to local businesses, convergence arises.  
Perhaps, however, rather than converging, HRM is grounded in its institutional context and 
change is path dependent (Rosenzweig & Nohria, 1994). Early research found that countries were 
becoming more different rather than converging in their macro-environmental characteristics, and that 
any similarity was more likely between proximal than distant countries (Craig, Douglas & Grein, 1992). 
Comparative HRM literature asserts that firms are embedded in the country context in which they operate 
(Gooderham, Nordhaug & Ringdal, 1999; Gunnigle, Murphy, Cleveland, Heraty, & Morley, 2002), and 
as a result, are subject to local regulations and traditions affecting employment practices (Björkman, Fey 
& Park, 2007; Huo, Huang & Napier, 2002). This embeddedness literature, including comparative 
capitalisms (Hotho, 2014; Jackson & Deeg, 2008), argues that we should not expect to see convergence 
and that, in practice, non-convergence is more likely to be the norm. 
In short, the literature to date is equivocal as to whether convergence in HRM has been occurring 
globally. One reason is the current lack of integration across Comparative HRM and International HRM 
fields (Brewster et al., 2016; Kaufman, 2016). More specifically, the macro contexts of market economies 
have not been studied alongside the mezzo contexts of MNEs and their subsidiaries to see how these 
effects interact. We address this failing (Gooderham & Nordhaug, 2011), building from Tempel and 
Walgenbach (2007), who critique both neo-institutional and comparative capitalisms theorizing for its 
lack of attention to firm-level analyses. Moreover, we address a shortcoming in extant convergence 
literature which largely relies on reporting consistent trends to identify convergence/ divergence 
(Kaufman, 2016).  Given the non-consistent (dynamic) context in which firms are operating, we develop a 
more nuanced way of studying the convergence process that can incorporate the dynamics of firms’ 
institutional contexts.  
The empirical contribution of this study is its focus on data covering a broad range of HRM 
practices gathered over three points in time across multiple countries, based on the Cranet surveys. Prior 
studies using this database have focused on a narrower range of practices and/ or a shorter or more distant 
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period of time - examples of these studies are summarized in Table 1. Other than Goergen, Brewster, 
Wood and Wilkinson (2012), who focus on organization-level analyses, all studies reported focus on 
country-level convergence. The most ambitious attempt was by Mayrhofer and colleagues (2011). With 
2004-05 as their end-point, they examined three bundles of HRM practices (development, reward, 
communication) as well as the configuration of the HRM department. Their findings highlighted some 
common national trends (directional convergence) but little evidence of country-level practices being 
isomorphic. We expand on this and other studies by exploring a more recent time period (1999-2010), a 
broader range of HRM practices (17 individual practices), and including comparison of foreign MNE 
subsidiaries with indigenous organizations, in different market economies. As Mayrhofer et al. (2011: 63) 
note with regard to the need for future research: “the interplay between drivers at various analytical levels 
is crucial”. This study is thus one of very few (see: D’Arcimoles, 1997; Guest, Michie, Conway, & 
Sheehan, 2003) to explore change in the adoption of HRM practices over an extended period of time 
across multiple countries.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
GLOBALIZATION, CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE 
The international business (IB) literature has debated the globalization phenomenon in relation to HRM 
practice convergence (Edwards et al., 2016; Huo et al., 2002; Mayrhofer et al., 2011). Convergence is, by 
definition, a process that occurs over time, whereby organizations adopt more similar practices, leading 
ultimately to universal implementation (‘final’ convergence) or parallel trends (‘directional’ convergence) 
(Mayrhofer, Müller-Camen, Ledolter, Strunk, & Erten, 2002; Mayrhofer et al., 2011). Divergence, in 
contrast, occurs when HRM practices being adopted by different organizations become more dissimilar 
over time. In most cases, extant research has focused on establishing whether convergence/ divergence is 
taking place or not, which leaves the field open to critique based on what Kaufmann (2016: 339) 
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describes as “the analytically problematic definition and measurement of the concept of HRM 
convergence–divergence”. We present here arguments as to how a more nuanced conceptualization of the 
convergence/ divergence process (i.e. extent of convergence) might address some of the current 
theoretical shortcomings in the field. 
The debate concerning the observed reality of convergence/ divergence is rife within the HRM 
literatures: The Comparative HRM literature largely argues for divergence due to the embeddedness of 
management practices within a given national context (Björkman et al., 2007; Gooderham et al., 1999; 
Gunnigle et al., 2002); while the International HRM literature observes the HRM activities of MNEs, 
presenting a stronger case for convergence based on standardization arguments of economies of scale and 
scope (Björkman et al., 2008; Edwards et al., 2016). This debate originated from the labor relations 
discipline, suggesting that work within industrial societies will look increasingly similar, because science 
and technology are universal (Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison, & Meyers, 1960), and as technology spreads, there 
would be increasing convergence “over time and place” (ibid.: 10) towards a single model of industrial 
society. Later studies agreed (Colvin & Darbishire, 2013; Katz, 1993), but noted that this extended further 
in some countries than in others (Marginson, Sisson & Arrowsmith, 2003; Schnabel, Zagelmeyer, & 
Kohaut, 2006).  
We argue that the operationalization of ‘geographic location’ is creating the confusion as to 
whether convergence or divergence is dominating HRM: Adopting a country level of analysis, as 
Comparative HRM scholars most often do, largely leads us to a conclusion of divergence; adopting the 
MNE level of analysis tends to lead to conclusions of convergence or at least standardization. The critical 
factor that is not being discussed is that isomorphism occurs within a specific ‘organizational field’, 
defined as “a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, 
regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983: 143). While firms react to isomorphic pressures in their particular field (e.g. country, 
industry, organization type, size of operation), nation states affect the extent of isomorphism across 
organizational fields (Scott & Meyer, 1994; Tempel & Walgenbach, 2007). To move this debate forward, 
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we explore the HRM convergence/ divergence debate focusing on two levels of geographic location that 
have not been studied together before: market economy and the indigenous firm vs. MNE foreign 
subsidiary. 
 
Market economies 
 Market economies are expected to differ in their pattern of HRM practice adoption and diffusion 
based on “systematically interdependent configurations” (Jackson & Deeg, 2008: 545). The varieties of 
capitalism literature (Hall & Soskice, 2001) identifies two ideal types of market economy - liberal market 
economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs). LMEs are the Anglo-Saxon societies 
(e.g. the U.S.A., U.K., Australia), dominated by shareholder ownership, focused on short-term profit 
maximization, preferring a minimal role for government, with deregulated labor markets and strong 
market competition. CMEs, typified by Germany, have a wider stakeholder approach, higher regulation of 
the labor market and hence less firm autonomy, with a longer-term focus on return on investment. In 
LMEs, internal relationships echo the competitive and utilitarian relationships of the external market, 
while in CMEs there is more employer-employee interdependence (Hall & Soskice, 2001).  
The comparative capitalisms literature argues for ‘institutional complementarities’, whereby the 
characteristics of each type of market economy give them their value (Höpner, 2005), and institutions 
work together to reinforce or substitute for each other in a way that creates economic success, creating 
within market economy convergence and between market economy divergence. This is in line with 
institutional logics theory, which identifies the “socially constructed historical patterns of cultural 
symbols and material practices, including assumptions, values and beliefs, by which individuals and 
organizations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce their lives 
and experiences” (Thornton et al., 2012: 2). These logics align at the level of organizational fields, 
producing institutional complementarities (Hall & Soskice, 2001) that represent mutually reinforcing 
relationships between different institutional logics at societal or organizational levels. 
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The comparative capitalisms literature struggles, however, to deal with two issues related to 
convergence. One is change over time (Thelen, 2014). The liberalization thesis posits that the Anglo-
Saxon model of LMEs is increasingly penetrating CMEs, leading to convergence to the LME model 
(Schneider & Paunescu, 2012). Alternatively, it has been argued that, despite this liberalization trend, 
substantial differences remain between market economies (Hall & Thelen, 2009). Thelen (2014) suggests 
that although there may be a growing movement in favor of certain kinds of institutional liberalization in 
CMEs, these may not lead to firms there operating more like LMEs. Such debates are typical of what is 
described as institutional change (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002): Institutions are formed over time, but 
the actors who are operating within these institutional constraints can also effect change, in turn creating 
new institutional conditions. The implication here is that a more nuanced understanding of the 
convergence/ divergence process may be required.  
 
Indigenous firms vs. foreign MNE subsidiaries 
A second issue that the comparative capitalisms literature struggles with is the role of MNEs 
(indeed, they are not mentioned in Hall and Soskice, 2001). If we take the case of MNE subsidiaries 
operating in a host country, these operations require an alternative conceptualization of the 
‘organizational field’ as they operate beyond national or market economy boundaries (Kostova, Roth, & 
Dacin, 2008; Tempel & Walgenbach, 2007), and are thus faced by multiple, potentially conflicting, 
institutional contexts. MNEs may attempt to leverage advantages from their global presence, hence 
foreign subsidiaries are not independent of the parent (Poutsma, Ligthart, & Veersma, 2006). MNE 
headquarters may try to impose standardized policies to subsidiaries in host countries, believing that their 
way of operating is what has created the firm’s particular advantage and that it is likely to hold in all 
contexts (Dore, 2008). MNE subsidiaries are, however, neither independent of headquarters, nor 
independent of the country in which they are located, where local institutions can play both constraining 
and enabling roles (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2001; Saka-Helmhout, Deeg, & Greenwood, 2016).  
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In any country, innovation may come from outsiders, such as MNE subsidiaries, who have fewer 
ties and less commitment to an existing order (Dore, 2008). Indigenous firms might in turn be influenced 
by foreign MNE subsidiaries and move their practices closer toward them. Evidence points towards 
noticeable convergence effects of these global players on HRM practices in host countries (Almond, 
Edwards, & Clark, 2003; Farndale, Brewster, & Poutsma, 2008; Ferner & Quintanilla, 1998; Gooderham 
et al., 1999; Poutsma, Ligthart, & Schouteten, 2005). Nevertheless, although local managers in the host 
country may embrace or resist the standardization of practices (Edwards, Sanchez-Magnas, Tregaskis, 
Levesque, McDonnell, & Quintanilla, 2013), they are unlikely to have total autonomy in their foreign 
operations (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Any evidence of convergence/ divergence is likely, therefore, to be 
complex and may not be linear in its progression.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF HRM PRACTICES 
HRM has long been a particular concern in the IB literature – being one of the most costly yet important 
resources for all organizations, and being particularly complex to manage when operating across national 
borders. Macro-level differences in practices, usually between countries (Brewster & Mayrhofer, 2012; 
Kaufman, 2016), are often explained through neo-institutional, comparative capitalisms theorizing 
(Festing, 2012; Goergen et al., 2012). Institutions (“the rules of the game”: Kaufman, 2007: 14) are 
argued to constrain the discretion of organizational actors to adopt certain practices, but the durability and 
determinism of institutional differences has been questioned (Saka-Helmhout et al., 2016).  
Institutional constraints can be broadly defined as comprising elements of legitimacy and 
efficiency (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Legitimacy is achieved when HRM practices are aligned with 
internal and external expectations, including legislative requirements and employee/ employer interests, 
whereas efficiency is focused on achieving optimal use of resources. All areas of HRM are subject to 
some form of institutional constraint, but some practices are expected to have a higher threshold to 
achieve legitimacy (i.e., those subject to strong traditions or regulations), while others can display greater 
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variation in practice with all forms similarly being considered legitimate so that efficiency may be more 
deterministic of organizational practice.  
Our theorizing around the extent to which we expect to observe convergence/ divergence related 
to higher or lower levels of institutional constraint is based on the two core arguments presented by the 
varieties of capitalism and IB literatures. The former relies on arguments that there will be greater 
similarity within a market economy than between market economies due to the differential extent of 
regulation of firms’ HRM activities across market economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Deeg, 
2008). The IB argument acknowledges the prevalent institutional constraints, but argues that indigenous 
firms are more embedded in the local context and thus will show more extensive use of constrained 
practices (Looise & Drucker, 2002) compared to foreign MNE subsidiaries. Although the subsidiaries 
must comply with certain constraints, they are not independent of the (foreign) parent (Poutsma et al., 
2006), and have local managers who are influenced by headquarters’ pressures for implementation of a 
standard global strategy (Edwards et al., 2016; Kostova & Roth, 2002).  
In summary, we predict considerable variation in HRM practice use between LME and CME-
based firms due to the different sets of institutional constraints, so that convergence of such practices is 
not expected to occur between CME and LME contexts. Similarly, we predict considerable variation in 
HRM practices between indigenous firms and foreign MNE subsidiaries, as well as less convergence due 
to continued standardization pressures faced by subsidiaries from the parent headquarters. We apply this 
reasoning to five areas of HRM practice (compensation, wage bargaining level, contingent employment, 
direct employee information provision, and training), illustrating why we anticipate each area might be 
considered more or less institutionally constrained. This in turn allows us to hypothesize which HRM 
practices are expected to vary or converge over time. 
Compensation practices are impacted by considerable differences in national pay structures, and 
fiscal policies (Fay, 2008; Festing, Engle, Dowling, & Sahakiants, 2012), and are frequently regulated at 
the national level in terms of statutory pay or minimum benefits. Financial participation schemes, as part 
of compensation packages, are also subject to local legislation, tax concessions, and industrial relations 
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systems and ideologies (Pendleton & Poutsma, 2012). Institutional constraints are high for compensation 
practices, as they are path dependent, tied into local norms, traditions, and corporate governance 
mechanisms (Festing & Sahakiants, 2010). We therefore predict considerable variation (and a lack of 
convergence) in compensation practices between LME and CME firms, as well as between indigenous 
firms and foreign MNE subsidiaries. 
We posit that the level at which wage bargaining occurs is similarly context-dependent, 
commonly influenced either through voluntarist systems or national legal frameworks (Brewster, Wood, 
& Brookes, 2008). Discretion regarding what is considered legitimate is potentially less where regulation 
is substantial (in CMEs: Thelen, 2001), such as a requirement to deal with employee representatives 
(Björkman et al., 2007; Huo et al., 2002). Similarly, less discretion is expected where MNE parents 
impose standardized policies, although the extent to which local managers in the host country embrace or 
resist these practices varies (Edwards et al., 2013; Kostova & Roth, 2002). An interaction effect of market 
economy and MNE strategy has also been found related to wage bargaining, with evidence that HRM 
practice is localized in more regulated European countries, particularly among European- rather than 
U.S.-owned MNEs (Gunnigle et al., 2002). 
Contingent employment contracts have legitimacy constraints driven by legislation in many 
countries. For example, in Europe, numerous reforms have promoted contingent employment by ensuring 
that it is regulated (Gialis & Taylor, 2016; Williams & Padmore, 2013). Firms choose to use their 
workforce flexibly, contingent on fluctuations in demand, changes in the organization of production, and 
the periodic crises typical of the capitalist mode of production (Kalleberg, 2003). Nevertheless, Tregaskis 
and Brewster (2006: 122), studying contingent employment contracts in Europe, conclude: “There is no 
evidence that either the regional institutional pressures coming from the European Commission or 
regional or global competitive pressures are creating ‘final’ convergence in organizational practice”. In 
other words, there are elements of legitimacy requirements in terms of meeting legislative requirements, 
but within those constraints contingent employment may largely be driven by more efficiency-related 
firm-level criteria. This leads us to predict that contingent employment practice will show less variation 
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between, and therefore be more likely to converge across, market economies, and when comparing 
indigenous firms and foreign MNE subsidiaries. 
We posit that training may also be weakly institutionally constrained, despite having country-
specific elements including local skill requirements, different skill formation trajectories (Thelen, 2004), 
and a range of government investment levels in education (Tregaskis & Heraty, 2012). Organizations 
likely consider these factors when devising training strategies, but are not compelled to implement 
particular practices. Efficiency may therefore be considered a stronger driver than legitimacy. There is 
evidence, for example, from comparative OECD studies (1995–2002) that training is largely dependent 
on R&D investments and deregulation of sectoral product markets, and less on, for example, unionization 
(Bassanini & Brunello, 2011). Training tends to vary with economic cycles, with budgets quickly being 
cut in a downturn (Goergen et al., 2012), being a matter of organizational choice rather than an 
institutional demand. We therefore predict that training demonstrates considerable leeway for 
organizations to choose which practices to adopt, largely avoiding institutional constraint. 
The direct provision of information to individual employees is perhaps one of the areas of 
practice least institutionally constrained (Brewster, Wood, & Goergen, 2015). For example, although 
European Union regulations set minimum standards around employee communication, these are largely 
concerned with collective and representative forms of communication rather than individual 
communication (Kessler, Undy & Heron, 2004). Direct employee information provision is therefore 
largely left to management discretion. From a legitimacy perspective, greater provision may be driven by 
the general climate of information sharing (i.e. what is normal practice), whereas an efficiency 
perspective might observe that managers feel constrained to provide information only when it is perceived 
that a positive outcome will occur.  
There is an additional layer of complexity when considering the interaction effect on convergence 
between market economies and foreign MNE operations. Extant research provides evidence of such an 
effect. HRM practices vary between foreign-owned MNEs, domestic-owned MNEs and domestically-
operating organizations, and these variations have been found to be smaller in CME than LME contexts 
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(Farndale et al., 2008). Similarly, Gooderham et al. (1999) found that U.S. MNE subsidiaries largely 
maintained their practices in other LMEs but they made more adjustments in their subsidiaries in CMEs, 
while Gunnigle et al. (2002: 276) noted “nationally embedded barriers to diffusion in strong regulatory 
environments”. This evidence implies that the local norms in LMEs may be closer to those of the foreign 
MNEs or that they allow MNEs more discretion than do norms in the more tightly regulated CMEs 
(Fenton-O’Creevy, Gooderham, & Nordhaug, 2008).  
In summary, we have argued that the extent of variety and convergence will be affected by a 
broad set of institutional constraints, i.e. a combination of legitimacy and efficiency drivers of 
organizational practice, determined at least in part by the market economy in which the firm is operating 
and whether it is operating as an indigenous firm or a foreign MNE subsidiary.  In order to develop a 
more comprehensive definition of ‘the extent of convergence’, the empirical study that follows attempts 
to categorize convergence, from which future research might benefit. In order to achieve this, we test two 
hypotheses based on the theorizing presented: 
H1: There will be greater variation in the use of compensation and wage bargaining level 
practices than in the use of contingent employment, training, and direct information provision 
practices, when comparing between: (a) liberal and coordinated market economies; (b) foreign 
MNE subsidiaries and indigenous firms; and (c) foreign MNE subsidiaries and indigenous firms 
embedded in liberal and coordinated market economies. 
H2: Convergence will be more likely in the use of contingent employment, training, and direct 
information provision practices than in the use of compensation and wage bargaining level 
practices, when comparing between: (a) liberal and coordinated market economies; (b) foreign 
MNE subsidiaries and indigenous firms; (c) and foreign MNE subsidiaries and indigenous firms 
embedded in liberal and coordinated market economies. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 13 
 
In order to test the hypotheses, we use data from the on-going Cranet surveys on HRM. The Cranet 
questionnaire is designed by an international team in English, translated and back-translated (Brislin, 
1976) into the language(s) of each country, and minimally revised between rounds of data collection to 
maintain consistency over time. The survey is distributed either by paper, telephone, or online (depending 
on location) by partners based in each of the participating countries, with each collecting its own sample 
data, later combined into an international dataset. The survey is targeted at senior-level managers 
responsible for HRM, who are selected as key informants as they are likely to be well-versed in the firm’s 
HRM practices (Huselid & Becker, 2000).  
Response rates for the individual countries represented here vary between 8% and 37%, with a 
mean of 18%. HR managers are asked to respond on items that cover many of the HRM practices in their 
organization, predominantly asking for yes/ no answers or for numbers or percentages. Example questions 
are: ‘Approximately what proportion of the annual salaries and wages bill is currently spent on training?’ 
(open response); ‘Please indicate the approximate proportion of your workforce who are on each of the 
following working arrangements: part-time, temporary, fixed-term contracts’ (answer options: not used/ 
<1%; 1-5%; 6-10%; 11-20%; >20%). 
We use evidence from nine countries and three rounds of the survey carried out in 1999-2000 (time 
1), 2004-05 (time 2), and 2009-10 (time 3). We exclude organizations that: (a) are public or semi-public, 
and (b) employ less than 100 employees. Both groups tend to have a distinctive nature with regard to HRM, 
which makes cross-national comparisons more complex to interpret when simultaneously including larger 
organizations and the private sector (Bozeman & Loveless, 1987). In total, 5,743 cases across the three time 
intervals of data collection are included (see Table 2). 96.3% of respondents were (senior) HRM 
practitioners. Across the whole sample, the median respondent organization size is 445 employees. The 
sampling frames used in each country generally produce stratified representative samples, and are 
consistent with those generated by other studies. The partners of the network report the representativeness 
of the country sample according to industry, size, and private-public sector proportions. The sample of the 
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countries included in this study is largely representative except for the private-public divide, which is not 
relevant here.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Measures 
Organization type. Organizations are defined as a ‘foreign MNE subsidiary’ when the respondent 
identifies the home country of the firm’s headquarters as being other than the country in which the firm is 
operating. Otherwise the organization is defined as ‘indigenous’. 
Market economy. The country from which the data were collected defines the market economy. 
Based on Hall and Soskice (2001: 19-20), the UK and Australia are examples of LMEs, while Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are examples of CMEs. The 
imbalance in the number of LME (two) and CME (seven) countries may be a limitation to the study, 
though it reflects the smaller number of LMEs in the world and is the same for many previous studies 
using comparative capitalisms theories. Australia was also the only non-EU country in the sample, 
although as an LME country it fits the comparative capitalisms analysis. Additional analyses were 
conducted comparing the default model with a model including Australia as an additional main effect. 
The results for the two models (available from the authors) were substantially similar, providing 
confidence that the model estimations are stable, and that there is no noticeable EU effect on the data. 
HRM practices. Compensation, wage bargaining level, contingent employment, information 
provision, and training practices were selected as a broad range of HRM practices. Respondents reported 
the extent of adoption of a range of individual practices in each of these areas. Table 3 provides an 
overview of the HRM practice variables and the percentage of organizations indicating use of the 
practice. 
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--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
Control variables. Firm characteristics (industry, organization size, trade union membership rate) 
are included as control variables given their pertinence to the ‘organizational field’ (Gooderham et al., 
1999; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). 
Table 4 presents the correlations across the whole dataset. There were no issues of 
multicollinearity among the independent variables, with variance inflation factors (VIF) of main effects 
ranging from 1.05 to 2.68. We conducted a multi-level random-intercept regression model using STATA 
(v14.2), using STATA’s (v13.1) program GLLAMM (v2.3.20) (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2004, 2005) 
as the dataset includes organization-level data of 5,743 firms nested in the nine countries1. The intra-
country coefficients across the HRM variables range significantly between 0.02 and 0.19 (on average 
0.09), supporting adopting the multilevel analysis approach. For all HRM practices, the full model results 
are significantly different from the random intercept only model with R2 ranging from .04 to .27 (mean = 
0.10). 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
RESULTS 
The following results present the hypothesized effects, above and beyond the impact of country, year and 
firm-level firm characteristics2. After examining the findings, the pattern of effects is categorized 
according to the extent of convergence observed, ranging from ‘constant no difference’ via ‘robust 
convergence’ and ‘robust divergence’ to ‘constant difference’ (see Table 5). To explain this further, we 
first present the effects of market economy (LME vs CME) and its impact on convergence (Table 6), 
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followed by the effects of organization type (foreign MNE subsidiary vs indigenous firm) (Table 7). 
Finally, we explore whether the interaction effects of market economy and organization type suggest 
convergence within the timeframe studied (Table 8).  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------- 
Observing the hypothesized (H1a) baseline LME simple effect (the effect in 2009-10 at the end of 
our timeframe3), there are four practices with significant odds ratios (Table 6). Based on the size of the 
odds ratio, reported here in decreasing order, company wage bargaining (4.49, p<.01), employee share 
ownership (2.70, p<.01) and group bonus (1.96, p<.01) are used significantly more in LMEs than in 
CMEs, while individual level bargaining (0.37, p<.05) is used significantly less. This provides some 
support for H1a as half of the compensation and wage bargaining level practices show significant 
differences in the likelihood of use across market economies, whereas there are no contingent 
employment, direct information provision, or training practices with significant differences.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
--------------------------------- 
To test for the occurrence of convergence in the use of each practice (H2a), we first observe the 
LME effect, exploring the odds ratios comparing time 1 to time 3 and time 2 to time 3 (Table 6 
interaction effects). All of the contingent employment (except for temporary contracts), direct information 
provision, and training practices indicate no significant difference in odds ratios for any of the time points 
studied. We refer to these cases as having ‘constant no difference’, i.e. the practice may have converged 
at some point in the past or never been different between market economies. Temporary contracts showed 
a pattern of robust convergence.  
In contrast, the wage level bargaining and compensation practices show more variation. There are 
three practices for which there is a significant odds ratio at time 3 (company level bargaining, employee 
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share ownership, group bonus) and that show a pattern of ‘non-robust divergence’, i.e. practices show an 
irregular trend of difference over time ending in significant difference in 2009-10. Two practices show a 
pattern of ‘robust convergence’ (site level bargaining, profit sharing): The significant odds ratio 
comparing time 1 to time 3 decreases in size when comparing time 2 to time 3, and is non-significant in 
the baseline. There are also two practices that do not have significant odds ratios in the baseline (national 
level bargaining, performance related pay) that show an irregular trend of convergence over the time 
period studied, i.e. the odds ratio is non-significant when comparing time 1 to time 3 but significant when 
comparing time 2 to time 3. We label this ‘non-robust convergence’. Finally, individual level bargaining 
shows ‘constant difference’: The odds ratio is significant in the baseline, but non-significant at the two 
comparison time points.  
Overall, this gives some support for H2a as all contingent employment, training, and direct 
information provision practices displayed some form of convergence, while this was only true for half of 
the compensation and wage bargaining practices. 
Testing H1b (Table 7), foreign MNE subsidiaries differ significantly from indigenous firms for 
nine practices, six of which are wage bargaining and compensation practices. Foreign MNE subsidiaries 
make significantly more use (in decreasing order of size of the odds ratios) of employee share ownership 
(2.79, p<.01), group bonuses (2.16, p<.01), performance-related pay (2.14, p<.01), workforce briefing on 
finance (1.51, p<.05), company level bargaining (1.50, p<.05), strategy briefing (1.40, p<.05) and site 
level bargaining (1.30, p<.05). They also make significantly less use of national level bargaining (0.68, 
p<.01) and part-time contracts (0.57, p<.01). Overall there is support for H1b as three quarters of the 
wage bargaining and compensation practices demonstrate variation, whereas this is only true for one third 
of the contingent employment, training, and direct information provision practices.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
--------------------------------- 
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H2b explores convergence of practices over time between MNE subsidiaries and indigenous 
firms. Five of the nine contingent employment, indirect information provision and training practices show 
a pattern of ‘constant no difference’, while two demonstrate ‘robust convergence’. In line with H2b 
expectations, only two practices do not demonstrate convergence: Strategy briefing shows ‘non-robust 
divergence’ and part-time contracts ‘constant difference’. In contrast, six wage bargaining level/ 
compensation practices demonstrate some degree of divergence, with only two practices (individual level 
bargaining, profit sharing) showing a pattern of ‘constant no difference’, again largely in line with H2b.  
Observing the hypothesized (H1c) interaction effect between LME and foreign MNE subsidiaries 
in 2009-10 (Table 8), there are five practices with significant odds ratios. Decreasing in odds ratio size, 
these are temporary contracts (2.27, p<.05), strategy briefing (1.52, p<.05), site level bargaining (0.74, 
p<.01), part-time contracts (0.57, p<.01), and employee share ownership (0.45, p<.01). Testing these 
interactions, H1c is not supported as only one quarter of the compensation and wage bargaining level 
practices show significant differences in the likelihood of use, whereas one third of the contingent 
employment, training, and direct information provision practices show significant differences.  
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
--------------------------------- 
When we examine convergence and the combined effects of market economy and foreign MNE 
subsidiary versus indigenous firms (H2c) (Table 8), 11 of the 17 practices observed show a trend of 
‘constant no difference’. The exceptions are: a pattern of ‘non-robust divergence’ for share ownership, 
strategy briefing, part-time and temporary contracts; ‘constant difference’ for site level bargaining; and 
‘non-robust convergence’ for national level bargaining. These findings do not support H2c as the spread 
of convergence and divergence trends observed does not align with the expected division by practice 
areas.  
Looking across the findings, Figure 1 demonstrates the simultaneous relevance of market 
economy and foreign MNE subsidiary vs indigenous firms, relative to other factors included in the study. 
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As can be observed, country remains a dominant factor in many practice areas, however, market economy 
and foreign MNE subsidiary are, in addition to year and firm characteristics, important variables in 
understanding HRM practice adoption. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION 
This study has applied institutional theorizing to improve our understanding of convergence/ divergence 
as an outcome and as a process. The notion of institutionally-constrained HRM practices was introduced 
to explore the extent to which complementarities and isomorphism occur within a specific ‘organizational 
field’ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), exploring both market economy and foreign MNE subsidiary vs 
indigenous firm effects. While prior convergence research has primarily been restricted to observing the 
country or market economy organizational fields, we have extended this literature by including the dual 
(simultaneously global and local) organizational fields applicable to foreign MNE subsidiaries (Kostova 
et al., 2008; Tempel & Walgenbach, 2007).  
Our findings that convergence/ divergence occurs to different extents (i.e. is graded) provides 
empirical support for Kaufman (2016), who highlights the problems of current definitions of 
convergence, explaining the lack of inclusion of alternative permutations such as different conclusions 
being drawn depending on the time point at which comparisons are made. We argue that the convergence 
question is both contextual and temporal and is not a simple linear phenomenon given the dynamic 
contexts in which firms operate. We have therefore proposed a more graded conceptualization of 
convergence/ divergence ranging from constant no difference, through robust convergence, non-robust 
convergence, non-robust divergence, and robust divergence to constant difference. This allows us to tease 
out the more subtle manifestations of the process that can incorporate institutional context dynamics. 
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In order to provide this more graded conceptualization, we examined a diverse range of 
individual HRM practices, each one illustrative of practices that may be more or less affected by 
institutional constraints. The logic of market economy isomorphism would be that the practices most 
deeply embedded in the local context would be the least likely to converge across market economies (Hall 
& Soskice, 2001; Hotho, 2014). Similarly, we argued that the most institutionally-embedded HRM 
practices would be least likely to converge across indigenous firms vs foreign MNE subsidiaries: Whereas 
indigenous firms are strongly embedded in their local context, foreign subsidiaries are independent of 
neither the parent company nor the host setting (Looise & Drucker, 2002; Poutsma et al., 2006) and hence 
will be less likely simply to align with local firms. Specifically, we expected (and largely found) that the 
degree of institutional embeddedness would decrease (and the degree of convergence increase) when 
comparing the use of compensation and wage bargaining level practices with the use of contingent 
employment, training, and direct information provision practices.  
We first hypothesized that we would observe differences in the extent of HRM convergence 
based on the degree to which a practice area might be constrained by market economy institutional 
complementarities (Höpner, 2005). This was supported for half of the wage bargaining level and 
compensation practices studied (company and individual level bargaining, employee share ownership, 
and group bonus) aligned with predictions from comparative capitalisms theories (Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
Jackson & Deeg, 2008). For such institutionally-constrained practices, we also expected market economy 
differences to endure over time (Hall & Thelen, 2009). This was supported for the same four practices. 
We therefore surmise that these practices are particularly strongly institutionally constrained, rooted in 
fundamental differences in the employment relationship between the LME and CME contexts.  
In contrast, contingent employment (except temporary contracts), training, and direct information 
provision practices all demonstrated constant no difference between market economies, indicating that 
either practice has converged at some point in the past, or any differences are due to factors other than 
market economy. We conclude that these practices are less constrained by market economy institutions, 
and hence firms have greater leeway over choosing which practices to adopt (Hall & Soskice, 2001; 
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Hotho, 2014). Any institutional context is therefore not in itself determinative of the practices adopted by 
firms: Powerful firms have some leeway over how they adapt to institutional constraints for some HRM 
practices (Crouch, 2005; Jackson & Deeg, 2008), driven at least in part by the direction of the firm’s 
corporate strategy and the actions of management. 
We also observed nine practices showing significant difference in their likelihood of use between 
foreign MNE subsidiaries and indigenous firms. Six of these nine practices were wage bargaining and 
compensation practices, each indicating some degree of divergence. This again supports our argument 
that such practices are more institutionally constrained (Festing & Sahakiants, 2010; Thelen, 2001). In 
practice, indigenous firms likely adopt the norms of their country, with foreign firms showing less 
mimetic isomorphism (Pudelko & Harzing, 2007; Saka-Helmhout et al., 2016). For less institutionally 
constrained practices, however, there is again more commonality of practice across firm operating 
locations. This is in line with Edwards et al. (2016), who explored the standardization of performance 
management (arguably also less institutionally-constrained), comparing practice adoption between 
indigenous and U.S.-owned MNEs across six European countries. They argued that countries with 
stronger institutional constraints reduce the adoption of typical U.S. performance management practices, 
though they conclude that such evidence is still limited.  
Although our findings are broadly supported by the existing literature as we have noted, there are 
several areas of unexpected details in the results. For example, we found that individual bargaining is 
used less in LMEs compared with indigenous firms in CMEs (although the odds ratio is small). This may 
be explained by the ongoing trend of decentralization and hybridization of collective bargaining in the 
CME context. National level bargaining in CMEs has come under pressure and is increasingly combined 
with bargaining at lower levels in order to leverage more flexibility in terms and conditions of 
employment (Traxler, Arrowsmith, Nergaard, & Molins Lopez-Rodo, 2008; Kalmi, Pendleton, & 
Poutsma, 2012). There is also a significant positive association between national and individual level 
bargaining in CMEs suggesting more leeway in setting labor terms and conditions individually. The 
strong significant negative association between company and individual level bargaining in LMEs 
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suggests more single level bargaining in LMEs compared to multilevel bargaining in CMEs: There is a 
trade-off between increased company, site and individual level bargaining in LMEs. We were also 
surprised that, compared to indigenous firms in CMEs, foreign MNE subsidiaries in LMEs tend to have 
lower use of part-time work. That may be because in CMEs part-time jobs are preferred to temporary and 
fixed-term contingent work arrangements due to its more stable character and greater employee-
centeredness: In LMEs the more employer-centered flexibility and efficiency offered by temporary and 
flexible working are more accepted (Chung & Tijdens, 2013; Williams & Padmore, 2013). Finally, the 
greater use of strategy briefings in foreign MNE subsidiaries in LMEs compared to indigenous firms in 
CMEs may initially seem to be a surprise, but can be explained as the mirror image of the lower use of 
trade union and works council channels for communication.   
Observing both market economy and organization type over time (H1c and H2c), we noted very 
few three-way interaction effects, indicating that the direct effect of these two factors over time has 
greater explanatory value. The findings indicate that HRM practice adoption in foreign MNE subsidiaries 
in LMEs rarely varies significantly from indigenous firms in CMEs. This could in part be related to 
characteristics of our sample: Only one third of the sample represented foreign MNE subsidiaries 
reporting strong control of HRM from headquarters, whereas two thirds reported being able to adapt 
HRM practices to the local context. This speaks to extant understanding that MNEs prefer to exploit 
subsidiary specific advantages (Rugman & Verbecke, 2001). In addition, in identifying ‘foreign’ MNE 
subsidiaries, the parent headquarters could be operating in the same type of market economy as the 
subsidiary, potentially diluting any ‘foreign’ effect. Future research might tease out these complex 
relationships in greater detail. 
Our findings indicate that whether we observe HRM practice adoption through the lens of market 
economies or of indigenous firms vs foreign MNE subsidiaries, we find a similar pattern of compensation 
and wage bargaining level practices being more embedded (and less likely to converge across market 
economies or firm operating locations) than contingent employment, training, and direct information 
provision practices. These findings demonstrate the need for more detailed theories of MNE global 
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standardization and of comparative capitalisms. Both sets of theories have tended to focus on economic 
pressures and institutional differences independently and have, perhaps inevitably, looked for measurable 
areas of institutional difference and similarity. There may, however, be important effects of ‘soft’ 
institutions (North, 1990). It may be, for example, that executives in MNEs choose to localize rather than 
standardize practices (counter to corporate strategy), because of the costs of overturning local 
assumptions about legitimate behavior. In this respect, the focus on hard institutional differences in these 
theories may need to be modified.  
The findings also raise theoretical challenges for the role of MNEs as understood in the IB 
literature. Comparing to indigenous firms, foreign MNE subsidiaries in any particular locale show both 
differences and similarities in their use of HRM practices. This provides some support for the validity of  
MNE organizational fields needing to balance global and local factors, supporting the ideas of duality 
(Kostova et al., 2008) and of the hybridization of HRM practices (Chung, Sparrow, & Bozkurt, 2013). 
Overall, our findings indicate that there are HRM practice areas where a more graded concept of 
convergence/ divergence helps us understand the processes that play out in dynamic firm contexts. As 
Figure 1 demonstrates, future research requires careful and detailed analysis to understand the range of 
antecedents affecting the patterns of use of HRM practices in firms internationally. 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
The simultaneous study of market economies and foreign MNE subsidiaries vs indigenous firms 
presented here brings together what have previously been two parallel streams of discussion around 
convergence and standardization in the Comparative and International HRM literatures. This has allowed 
us to develop a more graded understanding of convergence/ divergence than has been available to date. 
We have also been able to apply our theorizing to a more comprehensive and diverse range of HRM 
practices than has been done hitherto. 
Despite the intriguing findings, our study, of course, has certain limitations. Firstly, the survey 
uses a single respondent approach, although the critical issue is the collection of data from the most 
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knowledgeable sources. Obtaining more raters may increase reliability but, except in cases where the 
views of the respondents or areas of their specific knowledge are being studied, will not increase the 
accuracy (validity) of the raters’ evaluations. In short, it is not simply how many people respond to a 
survey that is critical but whether the respondents are knowledgeable (Huselid & Becker, 2000).  
The study is also limited by the use of ‘country’ as a proxy control variable rather than including 
other national economic indicators that might capture change over time. It was decided not to include 
economic indicators given the broadly similar level of economic development of the countries included 
and a lack of variance in GDP growth over the timespan studied (all, broadly speaking, being rich 
countries with similarly qualified workforces). Although interesting for future studies, we also did not 
develop hypotheses at the industry or organization size level for similar reasons. These will be important 
variables to consider in future research as they are known to influence HRM (Gooderham et al., 1999; 
Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991).  
The response rate within each country might also be considered a limitation. The rates are 
comparable with other large scale, international surveys (Mayrhofer et al., 2011) and are acceptable for 
whole-population samples, as the survey is in many smaller countries. Obviously more respondents are 
always preferred, but since our interest is in comparative trends, the sample within each country is 
broadly representative of the economies, as measured against Eurostat and NACE evidence, rather than 
being matched in terms of sector and size or the proportion of MNEs. Cranet data, although longitudinal, 
are not the result of a panel survey. It is a repeated cross-sectional design in which longitudinal data is 
collected “on the same set of variables for (and perhaps at) two or more periods to include non-identical 
but comparable cases in each period” (Menard, 2007: 2-3). This repeated cross-sectional form of non-
cohort longitudinal analysis is “well-suited to examine change in values of variables in relationships” 
(ibid: 6). 
The analysis is also limited to some extent by our selection of HRM practices, although we argue 
that they are illustrative of practices that may be either more or less institutionally constrained. We urge 
future research to continue to focus on individual HRM practices (rather than HRM system bundles), as 
 25 
 
our findings indicate clear variability in practice adoption in our comparisons. We were also limited to 
nine countries, and the results therefore may not be generalizable to other LME and CME contexts. Future 
research could focus on other interesting examples of LME countries (e.g. U.S.A.) and CME countries 
(e.g. Japan). The LME/ CME dichotomy that we used is the most frequently adopted in empirical research 
into comparative capitalisms, but more nuanced market economy taxonomies (Amable, 2003; Hotho, 
2014) could have been adopted.  
Finally, future research might explore why certain trends might be occurring over specified time 
periods. We limited ourselves to discussing convergence in terms of the equal likelihood of use of a 
practice, avoiding conclusions about directionality. Future research might involve qualitative studies that 
explore changes in HRM practice to uncover the dynamic processes behind convergence trends. For 
example, moving forward from our 2009-10 end point, it will be interesting to see the impact that the 
global financial crisis that began in 2008 had on HRM practice adoption over the longer-term. 
Despite these limitations, the findings presented here can assist HRM leaders to understand the 
influences on their field of expertise, recognizing the importance of the context in which they are 
embedded at the firm and market economy level. Foreign MNE subsidiaries have different practices in 
place compared to indigenous firms but need to fit in locally, at least to some extent, i.e. the best form of 
economic organizing is that which delivers both efficiency and legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
When considering whether to adopt a strategy of globalization or localization, or some hybrid approach, 
MNEs can assess the potential challenges they may face by considering the extent to which the 
institutional constraints around specific HRM practices might vary across the parent and host locations. 
By undertaking such an analysis, implementation of the strategy might be both more efficient and yield 
higher returns. 
We suggested criteria against which firms might determine the extent to which different HRM 
practices are more or less institutionally-constrained. The evidence presented here points to wage 
bargaining levels and compensation practices offering less leeway for local adaptation away from 
institutional norms, compared with contingent employment, direct information provision and training 
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practices. The constraining element of institutions therefore needs to be considered per area of practice to 
avoid over- or under-statement. Overall, this study has highlighted that institutions matter: For firms, this 
means that discretion is limited unless they are able to influence these institutions. To this end, in some 
countries, particularly the CMEs where competition is less of a requirement, firms organize themselves 
into business/ employer associations to be part of the institutional context and to instigate favorable 
arrangements.  
In conclusion, our study provides insights into the phenomenon of HRM practice convergence/ 
divergence, offering a multi-faceted reflection of reality. This poses a challenge to theories of ‘constant 
white water change’, as much as it does to theories such as those dealing with comparative capitalisms 
that struggle to explain change. By adopting a more graded concept of convergence/ divergence and 
applying it simultaneously to market economy and foreign MNE subsidiaries vs indigenous firms, our 
study has revealed a more complex but arguably a more realistic picture than previous attempts to study 
convergence in HRM. Our assumptions of institutional constraint (or a lack thereof) were largely 
supported, offering a way forward in the understanding of which HRM practices are more likely to 
converge over time and which are more likely to remain distinctive.  
 
ENDNOTES 
1 OLS regression would have resulted in unreliable standard deviations because the assumption of 
independent observations would have been violated (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). 
2 Full models are available on request from the authors. 
3 Given the higher-order interaction parameters in the model, the lower-order parameters (e.g. LME) test 
conditional effects providing the baseline odds ratios for the reference group. In our model, the reference 
group contains organizations in the last year of our timeframe (2009-10). The corresponding interaction 
parameters involving the preceding years test whether firms in specific years have an additional effect 
beyond the baseline effect (see: Ai & Norton, 2003). 
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TABLE 1 
Longitudinal multi-country studies of HRM practice convergence using Cranet data 
Study HRM practice 
area 
Countries 
included 
Data 
collection 
rounds 
Research aims Analysis Conclusions  
Morley, 
Brewster, 
Gunnigle, & 
Mayrhofer 
(1996) 
trade union 
membership, 
recognition and 
influence, policy 
determination 
locus 
13 
European 
countries 
1990/ 91, 
1992, 1995 
To investigate a number of key 
aspects of industrial relations at 
the level of the employing 
organization as a means of 
evaluating developments in the 
nature and conduct of industrial 
relations. 
Comparison of 
statistics per 
year to signal 
trends but no 
significance 
testing of 
differences to 
explore 
convergence 
n/a 
Nikandrou, 
Apospori, & 
Papalexandri 
(2005) 
Broad range of 
HRM 
department 
measures and 
HRM practices 
18 
European 
countries 
2 rounds: 
1995, 1999-
2000 
To examine whether a change 
toward more similarities in HRM 
exists in Europe. To identify 
country-specific changes which 
may account for a country’s 
transfer from the periphery closer 
to a cluster, or from one cluster to 
another. 
Cluster 
analysis at the 
country level 
of analysis 
“the two clusters do not show 
any considerable change 
towards convergence” (p. 549).  
Tregaskis & 
Brewster 
(2006) 
Part-time, 
temporary, and 
fixed-term 
contracts 
5 
European 
countries 
3 rounds: 
1991, 1995, 
1999-2000 
To examine the extent of use of 
time/ temporary/ fixed-term 
contracts between organizations 
operating in different countries 
over time. 
MANOVA 
analysis for 
planned 
contrasts to 
test for the 
effect of 
country 
“There is no evidence that 
either the regional institutional 
pressures coming from the 
European Commission or 
regional or global competitive 
pressures are creating ‘final’ 
convergence in organizational 
practice” (p. 122). 
Brewster, 
Croucher, 
Wood, & 
Brookes 
(2007) 
collective 
representation 
mechanisms  
3 
European 
countries 
4 rounds: 
1991, 1995, 
1999-2000, 
2004-05 
To explore the general trend away 
from collective and towards 
individual voice mechanisms, 
reflecting a predominant 
trajectory of managerial practices 
Estimating 
and comparing 
probabilities 
of practice use 
“Our analysis gives the 
convergence argument some 
limited support in that German 
organizations, controlling for 
differences in size and sector, 
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towards convergence with the 
liberal market model. 
at country 
level 
show a decreasing tendency to 
use their works councils” (p. 
1259) 
Goergen, 
Brewster & 
Wood 
(2009) 
Trade union 
membership/ 
influence 
Western 
European 
countries 
3 rounds: 
1995,  
1999-2000, 
2004-05 
To test relationships between 
institutions, corporate 
governance, and union power. 
Logit 
regression 
analyses based 
on country-
level legal 
traditions 
“the strongest indicator of 
union strength was national 
legal tradition, suggesting a 
significant degree of path 
dependence” (p. 632) 
Goergen, 
Brewster, 
Wood & 
Wilkinson 
(2012) 
training days, 
training spend 
18 
European 
countries  
4 rounds: 
1991, 1995, 
1999-2000, 
2004-05 
To explore the relationship 
between national institutional 
archetypes and investments in 
training and development based 
on varieties of capitalism 
theorizing. 
Cluster 
analysis at the 
organization 
level of 
analysis 
“specific national realities are 
associated with specific firm-
level practices, underscoring 
the existence of clear 
alternative clusters of 
institutions and practices” (p. 
523) 
Mayrhofer, 
Brewster, 
Morley & 
Ledolter 
(2011) 
HRM practice 
bundles:  
development, 
reward, 
communication, 
plus HRM 
responsibilities, 
HRM-staff ratio 
13 
European 
countries 
4 rounds: 
1992, 1995, 
1999-2000, 
2004-05 
To analyze empirically the 
development of HRM in private 
sector firms in 13 European 
countries between 1992 and 2004, 
not only examining the extent of 
convergence in HRM in Europe, 
but also exploring the theoretical 
implications for the interplay 
between convergence and 
divergence. 
Comparison 
over time at 
country level 
of the use of 
bundles of 
practices 
(likelihood 
ratios) 
“We find considerable evidence 
of directional similarity – 
practices increasing or 
decreasing in the same way 
across the countries – but no 
evidence of final convergence – 
countries becoming more alike 
in the way they manage 
people” (p. 50) 
Poor, 
Karoliny, 
Alas, & 
Vatchkova, 
(2011) 
training, and 
role of the HRM 
department 
3 Central 
and 
Eastern 
European 
countries 
3 rounds: 
1995,  
1999-2000, 
2004-05 
To draw attention to the 
similarities in the historical 
background and in the transitional 
period of the post-socialist CEE 
(Central and East European) 
countries related to the 
modernization of the HRM 
function. 
Comparison of 
statistics per 
year to signal 
trends but no 
significance 
testing of 
differences to 
explore 
convergence 
n/a 
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TABLE 2 
Respondent characteristics 
 
Country Per cent Mean SD 
United Kingdom 24.67   
Australia 6.39   
Germany 18.77   
Sweden 9.73   
Denmark 13.53   
Netherlands 4.61   
Finland 5.45   
Austria 7.70   
Belgium 9.14   
Year    
1999/2000 41.56   
2004/05 37.77   
2009/10 20.67   
Industry    
Construction 4.56   
Transportation 5.26   
Banking and finance 11.58   
Chemicals 7.73   
Other industries 29.24   
Manufacturing 41.63   
Trade union membership    
0% 11.84   
1-25% 24.53   
26-50% 13.09   
51-75% 15.46   
76-100% 18.67   
missing 16.40   
Economy    
CME 68.94   
LME 31.06   
Organization type    
Indigenous 53.20   
Foreign MNE subsidiary 46.80   
Organization size  
  
Size(Ln)   6.33 1.20 
Size (median)  445.00  
 
N= 5,743 
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TABLE 3 
HRM practices descriptive statistics 
 
 
HRM areas and practices(a) 
1999-
2000 
2004-
2005 
2009-
2010 Total (d) n 
 Level of wage bargaining      
 National/regional level wage bargaining 57.7% 59.3% 69.9% 60.84% 5,743 
 Company/establishment level wage 
bargaining 
43.1% 55.6% 37.2% 46.61% 5,743 
 Site level wage bargaining 35.3% 36.7% 40.2% 36.84% 5,743 
 Individual level wage bargaining 70.0% 72.6% 84.0% 73.88% 5,743 
 Compensation    
 
 
 Share ownership 29.4% 40.6% 33.4% 34.44% 5,743 
 Profit sharing 40.4% 42.7% 41.9% 41.58% 5,743 
 Group bonuses 35.8% 37.4% 59.9% 41.37% 5,743 
 Performance related pay 59.8% 54.4% 78.0% 61.55% 5,743 
 Contingent employment    
 
 
  >10% of workforce on part-time contracts 17.1% 26.4% 34.9% 24.29% 5,596 
  >0% of workforce on temporary contracts 57.9% 80.5% 81.7% 71.51% 5,515 
  >0% of workforce on fixed-term contracts 53.0% 76.1% 81.2% 67.70% 5,511 
 Information provision    
 
 
 Workforce briefing on financial 
performance(b) 
81.0% 83.5% 80.7% 81.87% 5,743 
 Workforce briefing on strategy(b) 60.2% 72.3% 75.5% 67.93% 5,743 
 Written mission statement 79.5% 81.5% 83.2% 81.00% 5,679 
 Written corporate strategy 76.0% 80.4% 81.3% 78.76% 5,684 
 Training    
 
 
 Percentage of payroll costs spent on 
training 
61.3% 56.6% 78.3% 63.72% 4,316 
 Number of training days received by 
employees(c) 
87.9% 89.0% 90.1% 88.71% 3,993 
       
 
(a) Dichotomous items unless otherwise indicated - practice adopted (1) versus no practice adopted (0). 
(b) To employees beyond management alone. 
(c) Other than management. 
(d) Percentage of organizations reporting the presence of a practice (across all years combined). 
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TABLE 4 
Spearman’s correlations of HRM practice variables 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. National/regional 
level wage 
bargaining                 
2. Company level 
wage bargaining 
-0.10* 
               
3. Site level wage 
bargaining 
-0.05* 0.06* 
              
4. Individual level 
wage bargaining 
0.20* -0.21* 0.06* 
             
5. Share ownership  -0.07* 0.09* 0.04* -0.02             
6. Profit sharing  0.05* -0.02 0.04* 0.08* 0.09*            
7. Group bonus  0.02 0.07* 0.07* 0.03 0.16* 0.02           
8. Performance 
related pay 
0.03 0.04* 0.07*  0.08*  0.15*  0.09* 0.30 
         
9. Part-time 
contracts 
0.02 -0.01 -0.05* -0.05* -0.03 -0.04* 0.01 0.00 
        
10. Temporary 
contracts 
0.00 0.06* 0.04* -0.02 0.10* -0.05* 0.10* 0.07* 0.07* 
       
11. Fixed-term 
contracts 
0.07* 0.02 0.03 0.09* 0.03 0.13* 0.04* 0.10* 0.06* 0.19* 
      
12. Financial 
performance 
briefing 
0.03 0.04* 0.05* 0.02 0.11* 0.10* 0.10* 0.08* -0.02 0.04 0.03 
     
13. Strategy Briefing -0.02 0.08* 0.03 -0.02 0.12* 0.00 0.12* 0.08* 0.02 0.10* 0.06* 0.33*     
14. Mission statement 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.06* 0.01 0.09* 0.06* 0.05* 0.06* 0.02 0.14* 0.18*    
15. Corporate 
strategy 
0.02 0.05* 0.02 -0.01 0.12* 0.02 0.10* 0.09* 0.01 0.09* 0.04* 0.15* 0.29* 0.44*   
16. Training spend -0.02 0.04* 0.03 0.00 0.07* 0.00 0.10* 0.09* 0.02 0.08* 0.07* 0.08* 0.15* 0.10* 0.12*  
17. Training days -0.01 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.07* 0.01 0.05* 0.05* 0.02 0.04* 0.03 0.06* 0.11* 0.08* 0.09* 0.31* 
 
* p < 0.05. n = 3,993 to 5,743.
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TABLE 5 
Trend categorizations 
 
 Trend Baseline 
(2009-10) 
Preceding years Description 
1 Constant no 
difference 
No difference No difference in either 
preceding year 
No changing trend observed, ending 
with no significant difference 
2 Robust 
convergence 
No difference Decreasing differences Stable trend of diminishing difference 
over time ending in no significant 
difference 
3 Non-robust 
convergence 
No difference Mix of decreasing/ 
increasing differences 
Irregular trend of difference over time 
ending in no significant difference 
4 Non-robust 
divergence 
Difference Mix of increasing/ 
decreasing differences 
Irregular trend of difference over time 
ending in significant difference 
5 Robust 
divergence 
Difference Increasing differences Stable trend of increasing difference 
over time ending in significant 
difference 
6 Constant 
difference 
Difference No difference in either 
preceding year 
No changing trend observed, ending 
with a significant difference 
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TABLE 6 
Odds-ratios of conditional effects of market economy on the use of HRM practices over time 
 
Practice Simple effect Interaction effects Trend 
 
LME LME x  
2004-05 
LME x  
1999-2000 
 
 
National level wage 
bargaining  
0.22 1.71* 1.35 Non-robust convergence 
Company level wage 
bargaining  
4.49** 0.30* 1.01 Non-robust divergence 
Site level wage 
bargaining  
0.80 1.89 2.10* Robust convergence 
Individual level wage 
bargaining  
0.37* 1.13 1.04 Constant difference 
Share ownership 2.70** 0.43** 0.86 Non-robust divergence 
Profit sharing 0.46 0.79 1.90* Robust convergence 
Group bonus 1.96** 0.30** 1.10 Non-robust divergence 
Performance related pay  1.31 0.45** 1.10 Non-robust convergence 
 >10% part-time 
contracts 
0.70 0.75 0.75 Constant no difference 
 >0% temporary 
contracts 
0.45 5.27* 6.10* Robust convergence 
 >0% fixed-term 
contracts 
0.65 0.81 0.58 Constant no difference 
Briefing on financial 
performance 
0.66 0.97 0.99 Constant no difference 
Briefing on strategy  0.71 1.46 0.99 Constant no difference 
Written mission 
statement  
0.71 0.70 1.26 Constant no difference 
Written corporate 
strategy 
0.58 1.26 2.11 Constant no difference 
Training spend 0.73 1.51 1.45 Constant no difference 
Training days 0.63 1.18 1.44 Constant no difference 
Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 using robust standard errors; Effects tested under conditions of: CME, 2009-10, 
Indigenous. 
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TABLE 7 
Odds-ratios of conditional effects of organization type on the use of HRM practices over time 
 
Practice Simple effect Interaction effects Trend 
 
Foreign Foreign x  
2004-05  
Foreign x 
1999-2000 
 
 
National level wage 
bargaining  
0.68** 1.29* 1.26 Non-robust divergence 
Company level wage 
bargaining  
1.50* 0.81 1.11 Constant difference 
Site level wage bargaining  1.30* 1.00 1.14 Constant difference 
Individual level wage 
bargaining  
1.33 0.82 0.80 Constant no difference 
Share ownership 2.79** 0.85 0.74 Constant difference 
Profit sharing 1.20 1.07 1.20 Constant no difference 
Group bonus 2.16** 0.49** 0.75 Non-robust divergence 
Performance related pay  2.14** 0.69 0.84 Constant difference 
 >10% part-time contracts 0.57** 1.26 0.79 Constant difference 
 >0% temporary contracts 1.27 0.87 1.12 Constant no difference 
 >0% fixed-term contracts 1.29 0.85 0.98 Constant no difference 
Briefing on financial 
performance 
1.51* 0.77 1.02 Constant no difference 
Briefing on strategy  1.40* 1.12 0.83* Non-robust divergence 
Written mission statement  1.01 1.19 1.71* Robust convergence 
Written corporate strategy 1.25 1.09 1.52** Robust convergence 
Training spend 0.92 1.04 1.26 Constant no difference 
Training days 1.07 1.05 1.47 Constant no difference 
Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 using robust standard errors; Effects tested under conditions of: Indigenous, 
2009-10, CME. 
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TABLE 8 
Odds-ratios of conditional interaction effects of market economy and organization type on the use 
of HRM practices over time 
 
Practice  
 
LME x 
Foreign 
LME x 
Foreign x 
2004-05 
LME x 
Foreign x 
1999-2000 
 
Trend 
 
National level wage 
bargaining  
1.14 0.54** 0.69 Non-robust convergence 
Company level wage 
bargaining  
0.64 0.99 0.69 Constant no difference 
Site level wage bargaining  0.74** 1.70 1.00 Constant difference 
Individual level wage 
bargaining  
1.27 0.65 0.78 Constant no difference 
Share ownership 0.45** 1.77** 2.23** Non-robust divergence 
Profit sharing 0.49 1.55 1.45 Constant no difference 
Group bonus 0.88 1.00 1.11 Constant no difference 
Performance related pay  0.75 1.00 1.30 Constant no difference 
 >10% part-time contracts 0.57* 1.76* 1.67 Non-robust divergence 
 >0% temporary contracts 2.27* 0.40** 0.48 Non-robust divergence 
 >0% fixed-term contracts 1.82 0.42 0.63 Constant no difference 
Briefing on financial 
performance 
0.95 1.21 1.26 Constant no difference 
Briefing on strategy  1.52* 0.41** 0.94 Non-robust divergence 
Written mission statement  1.46 0.77 0.55 Constant no difference 
Written corporate strategy 0.98 0.88 0.72 Constant no difference 
Training spend 1.60 0.76 0.79 Constant no difference 
Training days 0.85 0.95 0.77 Constant no difference 
Notes: ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 using robust standard errors; Effects tested under conditions of: Indigenous, 
CME, 2009-10. 
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FIGURE 1 
Effect sizes on HRM practice use 
 
  
 
Notes: Per practice, bar 1 = level 1 (country), bar 2 = level 2 (firm characteristics, year, foreign MNE subsidiary*year, market economy*year); 
McKelvey-Zavoina R. The first components entered are the country (level 1) and the firm characteristics and year (level 2, main effects only), 
subsequently followed by foreign MNE subsidiary including year interactions, and market economy including year interactions. 
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